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Developing countries sharing nearly identical growth trends for centuries 
dramatically diverged in terms of income per capita over the last half-
century. Using data from 78 developing countries, this study shows that the 
Green Revolution (GR) since the 1960s can explain most of the income 
divergence. Beyond the understanding that agriculture growth promotes 
economic growth, the study shows that developing countries less suitable 
for cultivating GR crops were substantially damaged by GR-induced grain 
imports, which increased fertility and retarded human and physical capital 
formation. A counterfactual analysis removing GR’s effect showed parallel 
growth trends similar to that prior to the GR.  
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The dramatic transformation in the distribution of income across the globe in the 
past two centuries is one of the most significant mysteries. As presented in Figure 1, 
the two major phases of income divergence in modern history coincided with the two 
agricultural revolutions in terms of both timing and region. Starting around the early 
19th century, Western countries diverged gradually from the rest of the world, closely 
following the British Agricultural Revolution, which took place most remarkably in 18th 
century England and then spread first to Europe and Western offshoots (Overton 1996, 
Allen 2011).1 The figure also classifies countries that have been lagging since the first 
income divergence into two groups based on their 2000 adoption rate of high-yielding 
crop varieties (HYVs), which characterized the Green Revolution (GR) in the 
developing world since the 1960s (Pingali 2012). It shows that after sharing virtually 
identical growth trends for centuries, countries with high HYV adoption suddenly took 
off and diverged from the rest of the developing world since the GR. These coincidences 
naturally lead to the conjecture that the agricultural revolution is a major cause of the 
global income divergence. 
  
Figure 1. Two phases of income divergence in modern history 
Notes: This figure classifies 134 countries with a population of more than 1 million in 1960 into three groups: 
30 developed countries from the Western world (including most European countries, Western offshoots, and Japan; 
excluding Eastern European and South American countries), 66 developing countries with the 2000 adoption rate of 
high-yielding crop varieties (HYVs) below the developing world average (i.e., the low HYV adoption countries, see 
Section 4.2 for details), and the remaining 38 countries (i.e., the high HYV adoption countries). The data on GDP 
per capita (in thousand 2011US$) are derived from the Maddison Project Database 2018. 
 
1 The first income divergence in Figure 1 is usually referred to as the Great Divergence or European 
miracle (Jones 1981, Pomeranz 2000). 
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However, the importance of the agricultural revolution for historical income 
divergence has not been quantified, although there exists abundant evidence suggesting 
positive causal links from agricultural growth to economic development.2 Existing 
studies mainly explain the first income divergence (i.e., the Great Divergence) by non-
agricultural factors such as geographical and institutional factors, human capital 
formation, ethnicity, colonialism, and globalization.3 The second income divergence is 
generally recognized as the “conditional convergence” between the developing and 
developed world (Ben-David 1993, Acemoglu 2009), instead of the income divergence 
among developing countries highlighted in this study. The conditional convergence, 
instead of the unconditional convergence predicted by workhorse growth models, is 
usually explained by cross-country differences in saving rates, fertility rates, human 
capital, institutional quality, colonial history, and geographical features (Barro and Sala-
i-Martin 2004). 
This study attempts to quantify the causal effect of the agricultural revolution on 
cross-country income divergence using data from the GR.4 The GR has remarkably 
increased grain productivity in the developing world; however, the productivity gains 
have been significantly uneven across developing countries (Evenson 2005). By 
examining the GR’s effect on country-level GDP per capita, this study attempts to 
answer the following questions: To what extent could the asymmetric effect of the GR 
across developing countries explain the second income divergence? What are the 
mechanisms behind the effect? Has the growth of countries benefited more from the 
GR adversely affecting the growth of countries that gained less agricultural productivity 
from the GR? Why does the second income divergence occur so much more 
 
2 Important recent studies on the positive causal links include, for example, Nunn and Qian (2011), 
Kopsidis and Wolf (2012), Andersen et al. (2016), Chen and Kung (2016), Bustos et al. (2016), Dall 
Schmidt et al. (2018), Gollin et al. (2018), and Carillo (2021). 
3 For example, Mokyr (2001) and Acemoglu et al. (2005) argued that institutions that facilitated the 
protection of property rights and the diffusion of knowledge have been the prime factors that enabled the 
earlier European take-off and the subsequent divergence across the globe; Jones (1981) and Pomeranz 
(2000) emphasized the effect of geographical factors on economic growth and the Great Divergence; and 
Galor and Weil (2000) and Galor and Mountford (2006) highlighted the role of human capital in the 
Great Divergence. 
4 Verifying the causal link from the British Agricultural Revolution to the first income divergence 
has been difficult because both events occurred gradually and lasted for centuries (Mokyr 2011, Jones 
2016). It is almost not possible to exclude the possibility that it might be the high food demand and 
improved technology from the emerged European countries that caused the British Agricultural 
Revolution. Another important difficulty is the lack of cross-country comparable agricultural data for 




There are two facts that are critical for understanding the impact of the GR on 
income divergence. First, agricultural productivity gained from the GR differed 
substantially across developing countries with different suitability for cultivating GR 
crops (i.e., HYVs). Second, developing countries less suitable for cultivating HYVs 
experienced dramatic increases in grain imports following the GR (see Figure 2). Based 
on these facts, I developed a simple model to understand the impact of the GR. The 
model assumes two otherwise identical open countries, one is suitable for cultivating 
the HYVs (GR-advantaged) while the other is not (GR-disadvantaged). Each country 
contains three sectors: mining, agriculture, and manufacturing; agriculture and 
manufacturing produce consumption goods, while mining produces raw materials for 
manufacturing. The model depends on three assumptions to draw implications: (i) 
learning-by-doing is the driving force of economic growth, and manufacturing has the 
highest potential of learning; (ii) human capital is a necessary input in production, and 
higher returns to human capital reduce fertility and increase education; and (iii) Engel’s 
law is embodied in the utility function and thus the demand shifts from food to 
manufactures as per capita agriculture output growth. 
For the GR-advantaged country, the model predicts that higher agricultural growth 
from the GR reduces food prices, shifts labor to non-agricultural sectors, increases the 
production in manufacturers, enhances the manufacturing productivity (through 
learning-by-doing), raises returns to human capital, reduces fertility, increases 
education, reduces manufacturing prices, and increases raw material prices. The GR 
has no direct effect on the country unsuitable for cultivating HYVs but causes it to 
increase imports of food and manufactures and to increase the exports of raw materials 
by altering international prices. For the GR-disadvantaged country, the GR-induced 
trade shifts production from agriculture and manufacturing to mining, reduces learning 
and thus productivity growth in manufacturing, reduces returns to human capital, 
increases fertility, and reduces education. The opposite effect of the GR on growth 
determinants in countries suitable and unsuitable for cultivating HYVs leads to the 
income divergence between them. 
 
5 As presented in Figure 1, it took more than two centuries for the income ratio between the currently 
developed and less-developed countries to increase from 1.3 in 1800 to 3.0 in 2016; however, it took 
only half a century for the income ratio between the two groups of less-developed countries to increase 
from 1.2 in 1960 to 2.6 in 2016. 
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The model suggests two channels for the GR to affect income: the direct effect via 
domestic HYV adoption, and the indirect effect via international trade. Although the 
direct effect is expected to benefit all countries adopting HYVs, the indirect effect is 
expected to only benefit countries with high HYV adoption and to damage countries 
with low HYV adoption. The direct effect has been rigorously estimated by Gollin et 
al. (2018). Therefore, the main work of this study is to estimate the indirect effect and 
then combine it with the direct effect to evaluate the GR’s total effect on cross-country 
income divergence. This study estimates the indirect effect in two steps: first, it 
estimates the effect of the GR on grain trade; second, it estimates the effect of the GR-
caused grain trade on income per capita.6 
The estimations are based on 78 developing countries, whose data on the adoption 
rate of HYVs are available for the period of 1960 to 2000 from Evenson and Gollin 
(2003b).7 Using the HYV data, I constructed a measure of the GR’s differential effect 
on grain productivity across countries: the relative disadvantage in adopting HYVs 
(RDS), which is calculated as the developing-world harvesting-area-weighted average 
adoption rate of HYVs minus the individual country HYV adoption rate. According to 
the construction, a country with a higher RDS is more disadvantaged during the GR. I 
then estimate the effect of the GR on grain trade by regressing the log net grain imports 
on the RDS in a fixed-effect panel model. The estimation showed that a one-unit 
increase in the RDS raises the net grain imports by 8 percentage points. To address the 
concern that the RDS could be endogenous, I also constructed the predicted RDS based 
on the country-level agro-climatic suitability for cultivating HYVs (instead of the actual 
HYV adoption rate). A virtually identical effect was estimated when using the predicted 
RDS as the instrument variable (IV) for the RDS in the estimation. 
I then move on to estimate the effect of grain imports on income by regressing the 
log GDP per capita on the log net grain imports in a fixed-effect panel model that uses 
 
6 Note that, as will be detailed later, the main estimation uses grain trade (but not the trade of other 
products) as the intensity measure of the effect of GR via trade. This is primarily because the GR directly 
affects cross-country relative grain productivity (and thus grain trade), but it only indirectly affects the 
relative productivity of other products through affecting grain productivity. As such, using grain trade as 
the intensity measure could capture the GR’s effect through the trade of other products. Appendix C3 
estimates the effect by using the trade of manufactures and raw materials as the intensity measures. All 
estimates indicate that the GR-induced trade significantly reduces income per capita in the GR-
disadvantaged countries, irrespective of the trade measure used. 
7 The 78 countries accounted for approximately 90 of the developing world population in 1960, 
according to the Maddison Project Database 2018. The study sample will be extended to 118 countries 
and up to the year of 2016 for robustness checks. 
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the (predicted) RDS as the IV for grain imports. The estimation showed that a 1 
percentage point increase in net grain imports reduces GDP per capita by 0.14 
percentage points. Combining this estimate with the estimated effect of the GR on grain 
imports, I found that for an average GR-disadvantaged country (where the RDS>0), the 
GR-caused grain imports reduced its GDP per capita by 42 percentage points (of the 
1960 GDP per capita) by 2000. The estimated effects are comparable when including 
various control variables, using alternative IVs, measuring grain imports by the import-
consumption ratio, or employing a standardized measure for the RDS. I also employed 
mediation analyses to investigate why grain imports have such a large detrimental effect 
on the GDP per capita. The analyses showed that grain imports substantially increased 
population growth, reduced years of schooling, retarded physical capital formation, and 
lowered the per hectare grain output. These mediator variables could explain 
approximately 80% of the estimated damage of grain imports on GDP per capita.  
To estimate the total effect of the GR on income divergence, I had to obtain the 
GR’s direct effect via HYV adoption. The direct effect can be estimated by replicating 
the estimation of Gollin et al. (2018), using the dataset of the current study. Similar to 
Gollin et al. (2018), the estimation showed that a 1% increase in the HYV adoption rate 
led to a 1.53 percentage point increase in the GDP per capita. The sum of the estimated 
indirect and direct effects indicates that the GR had substantially raised the cross-
country income divergence. Among the 78 developing countries examined, 38 
benefited from the GR, whereas the remaining 40 were damaged. The average gain of 
the benefited countries was 66.2 percentage points (of the 1960 GDP per capita) by 
2000, and the average loss of the damaged countries was 44.3 percentage points.8 
Therefore, if the 1960 incomes were the same for the two groups of countries, the GR 
could increase their income ratio by 1.9 from 1960 to 2000. A counterfactual analysis 
shows that removing the effect of the GR could eliminate most of the income 
divergence observed between these two groups of countries since the 1960s. 
In addition to identifying the origin of income divergence, this study also makes the 
following three contributions to the literature. First, it answers a question central to the 
development policies of most developing countries: whether agricultural growth is still 
necessary in a world with declining food prices? Although the conventional view is that 
 
8 The estimated damage of the GR is consistent with the observation that many countries with a low 
HYV adoption rate experienced a large decline in the GDP per capita during the GR (Figure B4). 
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agricultural development is necessary for long-run economic development,9 there is a 
growing debate over whether conventional wisdom still applies in a more integrated 
global environment with falling food prices (Hart 1998, World Bank 2007). Since the 
food prices today are determined more by border prices, declining world food prices 
may reduce the need to invest in agriculture. Unfortunately, this study shows that grain 
imports substantially retarded income growth in developing countries falling behind in 
agriculture and led them to specialize in unpromising extractive industries. Therefore, 
even in an integrated global environment, developing countries generally cannot bypass 
an agricultural revolution to successfully launch their economic transformations. 
This study also contributes to relieve the concern that domestic agricultural growth 
may retard the economic development for open economies. Some theoretical models 
(e.g., Matsuyama 1992) predict that agricultural productivity growth of an open 
economy may strengthen its comparative advantage in agriculture, thus delaying the 
transition to industry and harnessing long-run economic growth. No persuasive 
evidence, however, has been provided to support or reject this prediction.10 This study 
provides strong evidence suggesting that agricultural growth and the resulting grain 
exports accelerate, instead of delaying, the development process of open economies. 
This finding is rationalized by the fact that agricultural growth promotes human capital 
formation and learning-by-doing in manufacturing, which, in turn, enable the country 
to also gain a comparative advantage in manufacturing. Note that this finding is based 
on the background that there exist equally or less developed trade partners, so that a 
country that gained advantage in agriculture could easily gain a comparative advantage 
in manufacturing and lead the trade partners to specialize in extractive industries. 
Finally, this study contributes to the literature that identifies trade as an important 
source of income divergence. For example, Krugman and Venables (1995) and Baldwin 
et al. (2001) found that the reduction in transportation costs and the associated 
expansion in trade generated geographically based industrialization and divergence; 
Galor and Mountford (2008) established that trade enlarges income differences by 
 
9 This view has been formalized by recent theoretical studies (e.g., Gollin et al. 2002, Restuccia et 
al. 2008, Vollrath 2011) and supported by abundant empirical evidence (e.g., Foster and Rosenzweig 
1996, Bustos et al. 2016, Gollin et al. 2018). 
10 Although existing empirical studies generally find a positive effect of agricultural growth on 
economic development, most of these studies were conducted in the context of closed economies. In 
addition, the widely observed positive correlation between agricultural productivity and economic 
performances across open economies could not be taken as evidence relieving this concern because 
agriculture growth is generally endogenous to economic growth. 
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increasing fertility and reducing education in less developed countries; and Young 
(1991) illustrated that opening up to trade may inhibit learning-by-doing in less 
developed economies that may then specialize in more traditional production activities. 
This paper is in line with these studies because it finds that trade enlarges income 
divergence by asymmetrically affecting fertility, education, learning-by-doing, and 
specialization. The major difference is that this study attributes the income-divergency 
effect of trade to the underlying asymmetric effect of the GR.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents four key facts of 
the GR. Section 3 provides a simple theoretical framework for understanding the impact 
of the GR on income divergence. Section 4 estimates the effect of GR on trade. Section 
5 estimates the effect of the GR-caused grain trade on income and identifies the 
mechanisms of the effect. Section 6 evaluates the total effect of the GR on income 
divergence across developing countries. Concluding remarks are provided in Section 7, 
followed by four appendices. 
2. Four Key Facts about the Green Revolution 
There are four facts critical for the identification in this study: (1) the GR was 
largely exogenous to individual developing countries; (2) productivity gains from the 
GR substantially differed across countries; (3) world grain prices remarkably declined 
since the GR; and (4) grain imports significantly increased in countries less suitable for 
cultivating HYVs since the GR. 
First, the GR was plausibly exogenous because its timing was determined by 
international institutions and its intensity was determined largely by the local agro-
climatic suitability of major GR crops. The GR was a set of technology transfer 
initiatives that increased agricultural productivity in the developing world, beginning, 
most markedly, in the mid-1960s (Hazell 2009). International institutions, most 
importantly, the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), 
played a critical role in the GR. The crop productivity growth in the developing world 
was driven, by a large part, by crop germplasm improvements in CGIAR centers that 
were then transferred to national agricultural programs for adaptation and dissemination 
(Conway 2012). The GR’s success was based on scientific advances already made in 
the developed world for three major staple crops: rice, wheat, and maize (Hazell 
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2010). 11  Therefore, countries with agro-climatic conditions more suitable for 
cultivating the three major GR crops gained more agricultural productivity from the GR 
(Evenson and Gollin 2003a). 
Second, productivity gains from the GR widely differed across countries with 
different HYV adoption rates. As presented in Figure B1, for a sample of 78 developing 
countries, the average yield of the top 10 major food crops increased by 0.93 tons per 
hectare from 1965 to 2000, which equals to a 72% increase as compared to the average 
yield of 1965. Productivity gains, however, were substantially different across countries. 
For example, the per hectare output increased by 1.9 tons in the 10 countries with the 
highest HYV adoption rates but only increased by 0.4 tons in the 10 countries with the 
lowest HYV adoption rates. A simple regression indicates that a 10% increase in the 
HYV adoption rate leads to 0.15 tons higher per hectare output.  
Third, the GR had significantly reduced global real food prices. Evenson and Gollin 
(2003a) estimated that without the GR, world grain prices would have been 35–66% 
higher in 2000. Figure B2 shows that the average price index for the three GR crops 
(rice, wheat, and maize) dramatically declined from 38.5 in 1960 to 16.7 in 2000. The 
price decline was not driven by the low food demand because the world population 
doubled from 3.0 billion to 6.1 billion during this period. In addition, Table B1 shows 
that the domestic grain prices of developing countries are highly correlated with the 
world grain prices, even for relatively closed countries.  
Finally, the net grain imports have substantially increased since the GR in 
developing countries less suitable for cultivating the HYVs. Somewhat counterintuitive, 
many developing countries heavily depend on food imports for consumption (FAO 
2000, McCalla 2001). According to the FAO Statistical Databases, for the 78 
developing countries examined in this article, as many as 65 were net importers of the 
10 major food crops in 2000, and the (net) import-consumption ratio exceeded 5% in 
61 countries and exceeded 20% in 36 countries. As presented in Figure 2, for 
developing countries with an HYV adoption rate lower than the average of the 
developing world (i.e., the disadvantaged countries), the average import-consumption 
ratio increased from 5.9% in 1965 to 26.9% in 2000. Similarly, for the one-third most 
disadvantaged countries, the ratio increased from 13.1% to 37.0%. In sharp contrast, 
 
11 The CGIAR research programs focused on other major crops, such as cassava, sorghum, and 
millets, were introduced decades later (Renkow and Byerlee 2010). 
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for advantaged countries, the ratio declined from 13.2% to 4.9% over the same period. 
 
Figure 2. The import-consumption ratio of 10 major food crops 
Notes: The figure presents the net import to consumption ratio of the 10 major food crops for 78 developing 
countries in 1965 and 2000. The ratio was calculated separately for the advantaged countries, the disadvantaged 
countries, and the 1/3 most disadvantaged countries. The advantaged (disadvantaged) countries are defined as those 
with an HYV adoption rate higher (lower) than the harvesting-area-weighted average adoption rate across the sample 
countries. The data were derived from the FAO Statistical Databases. 
3. Conceptual Framework 
This section provides a theoretical framework to understand the impact of the GR 
on income divergence across countries. Since the contribution of this study is not 
theoretical, I only present the key predictions of a very simple model based on three 
well-accepted assumptions. The model assumes two otherwise identical open countries, 
one is suitable for cultivating the HYVs (GR-advantaged) and the other is not (GR-
disadvantaged). Each country contains three sectors: mining ( e ), agriculture ( a ), and 
manufacturing ( m ). The sectoral production functions are 
 ( ) ( ) 1, , and ( )e e e e a a a a m m m mY A H N Y A H N Y A H N E      −=  =  =   , 
where 
i
A   and 
i
N   are the total factor productivity (TFP) and employment, 
respectively, in sector , ,i e a m=  ; H  is the per capita human capital; E  is the raw 
material produced from mining; 
i  is the historical total output from sector i  (will 
be explained later); and ( )0,1  . Farmland and nature resources employed in 
agriculture and mining are normalized to 1. Identical agents consume food ( aY ) and 
manufactures ( mY ) to derive utility, whereas raw materials produced from mining ( eY ) 
are only used as inputs in manufacturing ( E  ). Total population is assumed to be 
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e a mN N N N= + +  , and the output prices are denoted as ip  . In the competitive 
equilibrium, wages are equal and markets clearing. 
The model depends on three major assumptions to derive implications. First, 
following the learning-by-doing literature (e.g., Young 1991, Grossman and Helpman 
1991), it assumes that learning-by-doing in manufacturing is the driving force of 
economic growth (Assumption I). Specifically, it assumes that manufacturing TFP 
increases with the historical total output ( 0m mA   ), agricultural TFP is unaffected 
by the historical total output ( 0a aA  = ), and mining TFP declines with the historical 
total output ( 0e eA   ).12 Second, it follows the standard literature on human capital, 
fertility, and growth (Becker and Lewis 1973, Becker et al. 1990) to assume that higher 
returns to human capital lead to lower fertility and higher investments in human capital 
(Assumption II). For simplicity, it assumes that human capital increases with the 
marginal output of human capital ( ( ) 0i iH p Y H      ) and fertility (and thus 
population) declines with human capital ( 0N H   ). Finally, it follows the literature 
on structure change (Laitner 2000, Gollin et al. 2002) to assume a period utility function 
that embodies the Engel’s law, which shifts demand from agricultural to manufactured 
goods as income growth (Assumption III). As most clearly demonstrated by Gollin et 
al. (2002), Engel’s law implies that increases in per capita agricultural output reduce 
food prices and shift labor out of agriculture. 
Because the model assumes that only one of these two otherwise identical countries 
is suitable for cultivating the HYVs, no trade could occur between them before the GR, 
and the GR only directly affected agricultural TFP in the GR-advantaged country. To 
facilitate the analysis, I denote variables as OV  for both countries in the case of no GR, 
as AV  and DV  for the GR-advantaged and GR-disadvantaged countries, respectively, 
after the GR but before they trade with each other, and as *AV  and *DV  in the post-
GR trade equilibrium. 
PROPOSITION 1. The GR increase income per capita in the GR-advantaged country 
by improving agricultural and manufacturing productivity, reducing population growth, 
 
12 Manufacturing in developing countries has a high potential of learning because technologies from 
the developed world are readily available for them to learn. Agriculture naturally has a low potential of 
learning because its productivity is mainly determined by factors unaffected by practice, such as sunshine 
and rainfall. Mining is subjected to “negative learning” in the sense that natural resources are depletable, 
and the extraction cost increases with the historical total output. 
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and enhancing human capital accumulation. For the GR-advantaged country, the GR 
leads to higher agricultural productivity ( A Oa aA A  ), which increases the agricultural 
output and shifts labor out of agriculture (Assumption III). Higher agricultural 
productivity also leads to higher returns to human capital (
a
Y H  ), which reduces 
fertility and increases human capital accumulation (Assumption II). Higher human 
capital and more labor inputs (shifted out from agriculture) lead to higher 
manufacturing output, which raises manufacturing TFP via learning-by-doing 
(Assumption I). 
PROPOSITION 2. The GR leads the GR-disadvantaged country to import food and 
manufactures and to export raw materials. In the GR-advantaged country, the higher 
agricultural productivity reduces food prices ( A Oa ap p ), and the higher manufacturing 
productivity reduces manufacture prices ( A Oa ap p ) and leads to higher demand for raw 
materials ( E ), which increases raw material prices ( A Oe ep p ). The GR-disadvantaged 
country is not directly affected by the GR ( D OV V=  ), so A De ep p  , A Da ap p  , and 
A D
m m
p p . Therefore, the disadvantaged country will import food and manufactures and 
will export raw materials until * *A Di ip p= . 
PROPOSITION 3. The GR-induced trade reduces the per capita income in the GR-
disadvantaged country by reducing the prices of food and manufactures, reducing 
manufacturing productivity growth, increasing population growth, and reducing human 
capital formation. For the GR-disadvantaged country, the GR-induced trade reduces its 
prices of food and manufactures ( *D Da ap p , *D Dm mp p ) and increases its prices of raw 
materials ( *D De ep p  ). These price changes reallocate labor from agriculture and 
manufacturing to mining, which increases the mining output and reduces the 
agricultural and manufacturing output. A lower manufacturing output and a higher 
mining output lead to lower productivity growth in these two sectors (since 
0m mA    and 0e eA    , Assumption I). A lower TFP in manufacturing and 
mining lead to lower returns to human capital, which increase population growth and 
reduce human capital accumulation (Assumption II). Although agricultural TFR is not 
directly affected, the lower food prices reduce the per capita agricultural income. 
Note that this theoretical framework is most closely related to that of Matsuyama 
(1992). By also assuming learning-by-doing in manufacturing and Engel’s law in 
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consumption, the model of Matsuyama (1992) predicts that an open economy with 
higher agricultural productivity tends to specialize in agriculture and, thus, is delayed 
in long-run economic growth. The model of this article arrives at an opposite prediction 
due to two additional assumptions. First, this article assumes that agricultural growth 
promotes human capital accumulation, which allows the economy advantaged in 
agriculture to also gain an advantage in manufacturing. Second, this article assumes 
three sectors, instead of the two sectors (agriculture and manufacturing) assumed in 
Matsuyama (1992), and thus allows the economy disadvantaged in both agriculture and 
manufacturing to specialize in the third sector (mining). Consistent with these 
assumptions, this study shows evidence that the GR leads the GR-advantaged countries 
to export more grain and manufactured goods and leads the GR-disadvantaged 
countries to export more raw materials. 
4. The Effect of the Green Revolution on Trade 
This section first constructs a measure of the differential effects of the GR on grain 
productivity across developing countries: the relative disadvantage in adopting HYVs. 
This measure is then used to examine the effect of the GR on the trade flows of grain, 
manufactures, and raw materials. The estimations confirm the prediction that the GR 
leads developing countries disadvantaged in adopting HYVs to import more grain and 
manufactures and to export more raw materials. 
4.1 Data 
This article mainly depends on data from 78 developing countries (listed in Table 
A1) from 1960 to 2000, in five-year intervals. The 78 countries accounted for 
approximately 90% of the developing-world population in 1960. This sample is chosen 
based on the availability of the HYV adoption rate data from Evenson and Gollin 
(2003b).13 The data on GDP and population were derived from the Maddison Project 
Database 2018, and the trade data were from the FAO Statistical Databases and the 
World Development Indicators. Detailed data sources of all variables used in this study 
are presented in Table A2. The key variables will be detailed when introduced in the 
analysis, and their summary statistics are presented in Appendix B1. In robustness 
 
13 Evenson and Gollin (2003b) provide the HYV adoption rate data for 91 developing countries from 
1960 to 2000. From this dataset, I excluded six countries where the GDP or grain trade data were 
unavailable and seven countries where the 1960 population was smaller than 1 million. 
14 
 
checks, the study sample will be extended to also include developed countries and/or 
continuous years from 1950 to 2016.  
4.2 The Relative Disadvantage in Adopting HYVs 
A natural measure of the GR’s differential effects on grain productivity across 
countries is the relative disadvantage in adopting HYVs (RDS), which can be calculated 
as the average HYV adoption rate of the developing world minus the HYV adoption 
rate of an individual country (a standardized RDS will also be used in the robustness 
check). The RDS is constructed based on the HYV adoption rates of 10 major food 
crops (wheat, rice, maize, barley, potatoes, millet, sorghum, cassava, dry beans, and 
groundnut) compiled by Evenson and Gollin (2003b), which is the most complete 
dataset on HYV adoption to the best of my knowledge. The HYV adoption rate of a 
crop is the share of the crop’s harvested area planted with HYVs. The 10 crops 
accounted for 96% of the total output of staple crops in the 78 sample countries 
(calculated as the average during 1960–2000, based on the FAO data). 
To construct the RDS, I first calculate the country-level weighted-average adoption 

















where jitHYV  is the share of the harvested area of crop j  planted with HYVs in year 
t   and country i  , and jitArea   is the harvested area of crop j  . The RDS is then 
calculated as follows: 
 tit itRDS HYV HYV= −  , 

















with the total harvested area of the 10 crops in country i  and year t  (
itTotalArea ) as 
the weightings.  
According to the construction, countries with a higher RDS are more disadvantaged 
in adopting HYVs. Figure 3 presents the variation in the RDS across regions and over 
time. It shows that the RDS was virtually zero for all regions (indicating no relative 
disadvantage) before 1965 but varied widely after that. The relative disadvantage across 
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regions generally enlarged over time. East and SE Asia and the Pacific (red line) and 
South Asia (dark red line) became increasingly advantaged during the GR (i.e., with a 
more negative RDS), whereas other regions become increasingly disadvantaged 
(although the RDS in Latin America and the Caribbean declined slightly after 1980). 
The most disadvantaged region was Sub-Saharan Africa, where the RDS was as high 
as 46.9 in 2000.  
 
Figure 3. Chronological and regional variations in the relative disadvantage in 
adopting HYVs (RDS) 
Notes: The RDS is calculated as the difference between the developing world (harvesting-area-weighted) average 
HYV adoption rate and the adoption rate of each country. The regional average RDS is calculated as the (harvesting-
area-weighted) average RDS for all sample countries within each region. The data for HYV adoption rates were 
derived from Evenson and Gollin (2003b). 
4.3 Identification Strategy  
With the RDS in hand, I estimate the effect of the GR on trade as follows: 
 1ln it i t it it itImp RDS Z    = + + + +  , (1) 
where ln itImp  denotes three dependent variables: the natural log of net import values 
(in 2011US$) of grain, manufactures, or raw materials in country i  and year t .14 The 
net grain import values are calculated as the sum of the net import values of the 10 
major food crops; the net manufacture import values are the sum of chemicals, basic 
manufactures, machinery and transport equipment, and miscellaneous manufactured 
 
14 The dependent variables are the total, instead of per capita, imports because the GR-induced 
imports significantly increased the population growth (Table 3). If the net import value is negative (i.e., 
the country is a net exporter), the natural log is calculated as ln| |itImp− . 
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goods; and the net raw material import values are the sum of fuel, ores, metals, and 
agricultural products besides the 10 major crops. 
itZ  is a vector of control variables 
(and will be detailed in the estimation); 
i
  and 
t
  denote the country-fixed effects 
and year fixed effects, respectively; 1  and   are coefficients; and it  is the error 
term.  
The coefficient of interest, 1 , captures the causal effect of a 1% increase in the 
RDS on percentage changes in net imports, based on the assumption that the RDS is 
exogenous. This assumption is supported by the fact that, as detailed before, the GR’s 
timing is determined by international institutions, and its intensity is largely determined 
by the local agro-climatic suitability for cultivating the major GR crops. In addition, 
the model substantially reduced potential endogeneity bias from omitted variables by 
including country and year fixed effects: the country-fixed effects account for the 
confounding effects of any time-invariant factors, whereas the year fixed effects 
account for any annual shocks that are common across countries.  
However, two potential sources of endogeneity concern still exist. First, it is possible 
that both the RDS and imports are affected by omitted country-specific, time-varying 
factors (omitted variables), which cannot be accounted for by the fixed effects. For 
example, both the RDS and grain imports are possibly affected by country-specific 
evolution of food demand caused by unobservable time-varying factors. Second, the 
real adoption rate of HYVs (and thus the RDS constructed from it) could be directly 
affected by imports (reverse causation). For example, it is possible that countries import 
more grain have a lower incentive to adopt HYVs and thus end up with higher RDS.  
To address the endogeneity concerns, I constructed a plausibly exogenous IV for 
the RDS. The IV is constructed based on cross-country variation in agro-climatic 
suitability for growing HYVs and on the differentiated timing of the development of 
HYVs for different crops. Specifically, as detailed in Appendix B2, the IV is constructed 
in four steps. First, I derived each country’s agro-climatic suitability for growing HYVs 
of the 10 crops from the Global Agro-Ecological Zone dataset computed by FAO. The 
agro-climatic suitability is measured by the highest attainable yield, which is estimated 
based on the local climatic conditions using complex biological models. Second, in a 
panel model with country and year fixed effects, I regress the real HYV adoption rate 
of each crop on the interactions between the crop’s agro-climatic suitability and a full 
set of year dummies, which capture the differentiated timing of the development of 
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HYVs. Third, I predict the HYV adoption rate of each crop in each year based on the 
estimates of the panel model and, then, use the predicted values to calculate the country-
level predicted adoption rate of HYVs. Finally, I construct the predicted RDS (pRDS) 
based on the predicted country-level HYV adoption rates. 
The pRDS is a good IV because it is strongly correlated with the RDS but plausibly 
uncorrelated with other determinants of the outcome of interest, conditional on the fixed 
effects. The cost of purchasing HYV seeds is independent of climate; thus, the net return 
of adopting them increases with the agro-climatically attainable yield. Therefore, 
countries with higher attainable HYV yields should have higher adoption rates. As 
presented in Figure B5, the predicted RDS is indeed positively and strongly correlated 
with the observed RDS. Equally important is that a country’s agro-climatic conditions 
should not be affected by the outcome of interest (reverse causality) or by the omitted 
time-varying determinants of the outcome of interest (omitted variables). Based on 
similar arguments, the agro-climatic suitability has been frequently used to construct 
IVs for agricultural productivity in the literature (e.g., Nunn and Qian 2011, Bustos et 
al. 2016), and the IV construction in this study is the most similar to that of Gollin et al. 
(2018). 
With the IV in hand, the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimate of 
1  from model 
(1) can be obtained. The first-stage of the 2SLS estimation is as follows: 
 1it i t it it itRDS pRDS Z    = + + + +  , 
where 
itpRDS  is the predicted RDS in country i  and year t , and all other variables 
are defined as above. Notice that, depart from the standard 2SLS regressions, here, I 
use a generated IV. According to Wooldridge (2010, p.124), parameter estimates in 
2SLS regressions with generated instruments are asymptotically distributed as in 
standard 2SLS regressions; thus, the standard errors of the 2SLS estimate of 
1  are 
asymptotically valid. 
4.4 The Estimation Results 
Table 1 presents the estimates of model (1). The estimation results confirm the 
prediction that for countries disadvantaged in adopting HYVs, the GR increased the net 
imports of grain and manufactures and increased their net exports of raw materials. 
Specifically, columns 1–4 report the estimated effect of the RDS on net grain imports. 
The OLS estimates in column 1 suggest that a 1% increase in the RDS leads to 8 
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percentage points higher grain imports, and this effect is statistically significant at the 
1% level. Because the average RDS for the disadvantaged (advantaged) countries was 
39.1% (-16.9%) in 2000, this estimate implies that the GR increased grain imports 
(grain exports) by 313 percentage points (135 percentage points) for an average 
disadvantaged (advantaged) country from 1960 to 2000.15 ,16 Column 2 reports the 
2SLS estimates using the predicted RDS as the IV for the RDS. The 2SLS estimate is 
identical to the OLS estimate, confirming that the RDS is plausibly exogenous. Column 
3 controls for eight potential confounding factors and obtains nearly identical estimates, 
suggesting that the finding is not driven by omitted variables.17 Column 4 excludes the 
(net) grain-exporting countries in 2000 from the sample and finds a large effect, 
indicating that the relationship is primarily driven by the grain-importing countries. In 
addition, Appendix B3 provides the falsification tests to show that the RDS had no 
effect on grain imports before the GR. 
The estimates presented in columns 5–8 indicate that the RDS has a significantly 
positive effect on the net import of manufactures, and the estimates presented in 
columns 9–12 indicate that the RDS has a significantly negative effect on the net import 
of raw materials. These findings are consistent with the prediction that the GR leads the 
GR-disadvantaged countries to increase their net import of manufactures and to 
increase the net export of raw materials. These estimated effects are also sizeable. The 
2SLS estimates reported in columns 6 and 10 suggest that a 1% higher RDS increases 
the net import of manufactures by 9 percentage points and increases the net export of 
raw materials by 10 percentage points. These estimates are consistent with the 
observations from the data that most GR-disadvantaged countries have experienced 
substantial increases in the net import of manufactures and in the net export of raw 
materials since the GR.  
 
15 The GR-induced grain imports account for approximately one-third of the observed increase in 
grain imports over this period. As presented in Appendix Figure B3, the log net grain imports increased 
by 2.5 over this period for an average disadvantaged country, which corresponds to a roughly eleven-
fold increase in net grain imports (i.e., exp(2.5) 1 11.18− = ).  
16 The estimated percentage effect is much larger in the disadvantaged countries because the average 
size of the disadvantaged countries is much smaller than the average size of the advantaged countries 
(including countries such as India and China). A calculation shows that the total GR-caused grain imports 
and exports from these two groups of countries were approximately equal each other. 
17 The control variables used are log GDP per capita, log population, the share of agriculture in 
GDP, the dummy of landlocked, soil rooting condition index, soil nutrient index, yearly mean 
temperature, and yearly total precipitation. The time-invariant control variables (i.e., the dummy of 
landlocked, rooting condition index, and nutrient index) are interacted with a full set of year dummies. 




Table 1. Effect of the relative disadvantages in adopting HYVs on trade  
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Log net grain imports  Log net manufacture imports  Log net raw material imports 
 OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS  OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS  OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
RDS  0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.10***  0.03*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.11***  -0.06*** -0.10*** -0.20*** -0.26*** 
(IV=PRDS) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.06) 
Eight control variables   Yes Yes    Yes Yes    Yes Yes 
Net grain exporter only    Yes     Yes     Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
First-stage F-statistic  47.4 95.6 189.8   21.5 38.1 103.9   19.4 18.1 51.8 
Observations 702 702 675 594  402 402 388 336  374 374 365 318 
R-squared 0.665 0.665 0.673 0.554   0.724 0.656 0.751 0.618   0.824 0.813 0.759 0.725 
Notes: The table presents the estimates of model (1). The eight control variables are log GDP per capita, log population, the share of agriculture in GDP, the dummy of 
landlocked, soil rooting condition index, soil nutrient index, yearly mean temperature, and yearly total precipitation; the time-invariant control variables (i.e., the dummy of 
landlocked, rooting condition index, and nutrient index) are interacted with a full set of year dummies. The sample sizes are smaller when these control variables are included 
because the data on the share of agriculture in GDP are missing for three countries. The first-stage F-statistic reported is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic. The standard 
errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the region-year level, and the regions refer to the five geographic areas presented in Figure 3. Significance levels are *** p<0.01, ** 




Note that the estimated effects of the RDS on the trade of manufactures and raw 
materials are less credible than that on the trade of grain for two reasons. First, although 
there is a direct link between the RDS and grain trade, the connection between the RDS 
and the trade of other products indirectly works through grain. As such, the estimated 
effects on the trade of non-grain products are potentially more vulnerable to the omitted 
variable bias. This concern is confirmed by the large change in the 2SLS estimate when 
additional control variables are included in column 11 (compared to column 10). 
Second, the data on the trade of non-grain products are unavailable in the early years 
for numerous developing countries; the sample sizes are approximately 40% smaller in 
columns 5–12 than in columns 1–4. As such, the estimated effects in columns 5–12 are 
potentially less representative of the developing world. Nevertheless, the 2SLS 
estimates are still sufficiently consistent for us to draw a qualitative conclusion that the 
GR had led the GR-disadvantaged countries to significantly increase manufacture 
imports and to significant increase raw material exports. 
Fortunately, the next section only needs to use the GR-induced grain trade (but not 
the trade of other products) as the intensity measure of the GR’s effect through trade. 
This is because the GR directly affects the cross-country relative grain productivity (and 
thus grain trade), but it only indirectly affects the relative productivity of other products 
through affecting grain productivity. Therefore, using grain trade as the intensity 
measure could capture the GR’s effect through trade of other products. In Appendix C3, 
I also estimate the effect by using the trade of manufactures and raw materials as the 
intensity measures. The estimation confirms that the imports of manufactures and the 
exports of raw materials substantially reduced the GDP per capita in countries 
disadvantaged in adoption HYVs. Note that if grain trade does not capture all effects of 
the GR through the trade of non-grain products, the main estimates presented in this 





5. The Effect of Grain Imports on GDP per Capita 
This section estimates the effect of the GR-induced grain imports on income per 
capita. The results confirm the theoretical prediction that the GR-induced grain imports 
significantly reduced the per capita income in countries disadvantaged in adopting 
HYVs. This section also demonstrates that the detrimental effect of grain imports on 
income per capita mainly comes from the grain-import-caused faster population growth, 
slower human capital formation, and lower physical capital investment. Appendix C3 
shows that the GR-induced trade of manufactures and raw materials also significantly 
reduced the per capita income in the GR-disadvantaged countries. 
5.1 Identification Strategy 
The model used to estimate the impact of grain imports on income is as follows: 
 1ln lnit i t it it ity Imp Z    = + + + +   (2) 
where ln
it
y  is the log real GDP per capita (in 2011 US$) in country i  and year t ; 
ln itImp  is the log net grain import defined before; itZ  is a vector of control variables 
(will be introduced in the estimation); 
i  and t  denote the country and year fixed 
effects, respectively; 1   and    are coefficients; and it   is an error term. The 
country-fixed effects account for the confounding effects of any time-invariant factors 
and the year fixed effects account for any annual shocks that are common across 
countries.  
The OLS estimate of 1  cannot be interpreted as the causal effect of grain imports 
on income before the following two issues are addressed. The first issue is the omitted 
variables. Although the model includes country and year fixed effects, the estimate of 
1  could still be biased by the omitted country-specific, time-varying factors that affect 
both grain imports and income, such as changes in transportation costs. The second 
issue is the reverse causation. For example, higher incomes (and thus wages) may 
promote grain imports by increasing food demand and reducing agricultural labor 
supply. If this is the case, the positive reverse effect of income on grain imports tends 
to offset the negative effect of grain imports on income. 
I attempt to address these endogeneity issues by using RDS (or predicted RDS) as 
the IV for grain imports in the 2SLS estimation of model (2). As detailed above, 
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conditional on the country and year fixed effects, the RDS is plausibly exogenous in 
the sense that it is neither correlated with any other country-specific, time-varying 
determinants of income (omitted variables) nor affected by income (reverse causation). 
In addition, the last section shows that the RDS is strongly and robustly correlated with 
grain imports. Therefore, the RDS is potentially a good IV for grain imports. Very 
similar results have been obtained when using the predicted RDS, which is even more 
likely to be exogenous, as the IV. Moreover, in robustness checks, I also use the distance 
to major grain-exporting countries as an alternative IV and find comparable results. 
5.2 Baseline Estimates 
Column 1 of Table 2 presents the OLS estimate of model (2). It suggests that a 1 
percentage point increase in net grain imports reduces the GDP per capita by 0.02 
percentage points, and this effect is statistically significant at the 1% level. However, 
the OLS estimate is likely subject to an endogeneity bias. Column 2 presents the 2SLS 
estimate of model (2) using the RDS as the IV for grain imports. The 2SLS estimate 
is substantially larger than the OLS estimate, suggesting that the OLS estimate is 
downwardly biased (potentially due to the aforementioned reverse causality). The 2SLS 
estimate indicates that a 1 percentage point increase in the net grain imports reduces the 
GDP per capita by 0.14 percentage points. 
Recall that for an average disadvantaged (advantaged) country, the GR had 
increased grain imports (grain exports) by 313 percentage points (135 percentage points) 
by 2000. Therefore, the 2SLS estimate from column 2 of Table 2 indicates that the GR-
induced grain trade reduced (increased) the GDP per capita in an average disadvantaged 
(advantaged) country by 43.8 percentage points (18.9 percentage points) by 2000.18 If 
the average GDP per capita were the same for the disadvantaged and advantaged 
countries before the GR, the GR-induced grain trade could have led to an income ratio 
of 2.1 between these two groups of countries by 2000, which is comparable to the actual 
income divergence observed between high HYV adoption and low HYV adoption 
countries in Figure 1. A more detailed analysis of the effects of the GR on income 
divergence will be presented in Section 6.
 
18 The estimated percentage effect should be interpreted relative to the GDP per capita in the base 
year (1965) when the RDS was zero. For example, the grain trade reduced GDP per capita by 43.8 
percentage points by 2000, which should be interpreted as the GDP per capita being reduced by 2000 




Table 2. The effect of grain imports on the GDP per capita 
 Dependent variable: log real GDP per capita 
(1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7) 
OLS 2SLS 2SLS  2SLS  2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Log net grain imports  -0.02*** -0.14*** -0.13***  -0.14***  -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.20*** 
 (0.00) (0.05) (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) 
IV No IV RDS RDS  pRDS  Distance pRDS, Distance pRDS 
Four time-invariant controls * year dummies    Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Including developed countries and more sample years       Yes   
Excluding net grain exporters         Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
First-stage F-statistic  33.9 32.9  16.0  281.8 15.9 14.6 
Hansen J-statistic (p-value)        2.18 (0.14)  
Observations 702 702 693  693  6193 693 612 
R-squared 0.935 0.841 0.863  0.858  0.916 0.910 0.816 
Notes: The four time-invariant controls are the log 1960 GDP per capita, the first official language, colonizer, and landlocked. The sample size is smaller when these controls 
are included due to missing values of some controls. The study sample in column 5 includes 118 developing and developed countries in continuous years from 1950 to 2016. 
The first-stage F-statistic reported is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic. The standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the region-year level. Significance levels are 




5.3 Robustness Tests 
This section provides the following robustness tests for the baseline 2SLS estimate 
in column 2 of Table 2: (1) including a range of control variables; (2) adopting 
alternative IVs; (3) excluding countries that were net grain exporters; (4) conducting 
falsification tests; (5) measuring grain imports by the per capita values; (6) using a 
standardized measure for the relative disadvantage in adopting HYVs; (7) excluding 
extreme values of grain imports; (8) controlling for linear and quadratic time trends; (9) 
clustering the error term at different levels; and (10) focusing on sectoral GDP per 
capita. All these tests support the main finding that grain imports substantially reduced 
the GDP per capita in the GR-disadvantaged countries. 
5.3.1 Control Variables 
Column 3 of Table 2 controls for the interactions between a full set of year dummies 
and four most frequently used time-invariant determinants of income growth: log GDP 
per capita in the base year (1960), official language, colonizer, and landlocked (see 
Table A2 for variable definitions). The time-invariant effects of these variables should 
have been accounted for by the country-fixed effects included in the model. However, 
countries differing in these factors may have different growth trends, which could bias 
the estimated effect of grain imports. The differential time trends can be controlled for 
by the interactions between these time-invariant factors and a full set of year dummies. 
The 2SLS estimate reported in column 3 is only slightly smaller than the baseline 2SLS 
estimate in column 2, suggesting that the estimated effect of grain imports on GDP per 
capita is primarily not driven by the potential differential trends associated with these 
time-invariant factors. 
Note that the model does not control for any time-varying determinants of income 
to avoid the overcontrol bias. Given that the timing and intensity of the GR is exogenous 
to individual countries, RDS should not be affected by any time-varying determinants 
of income. Therefore, any time-varying factors correlated with both the RDS and 
income could only be a result (but not the cause) of the RDS. In other words, these 
factors are the mediator variables of the effects of the RDS on income. Controlling for 
a mediator variable may partly account for the true effect of the RDS on income and 
lead to the overcontrol bias. The mediation effect of various time-varying income 
determinants will be examined in Section 5.4. 
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5.3.2 Alternative Instrumental Variables 
 Columns 4–6 of Table 2 tests the robustness of the 2SLS estimate to two alternative 
IVs: the predicted RDS and the bilateral distance between countries. Column 4 uses the 
predicted RDS, instead of the actual RDS, as the IV in the 2SLS estimation. As detailed 
before, the predicted RDS is constructed based on the agro-climatically attainable yield 
of the 10 major crops, instead of the actual HYV adoption rate. Therefore, the predicted 
RDS is even more likely exogenous (than the actual RDS) in the sense that the agro-
climatically attainable crop yield is not affected by any outcomes of interest. The 2SLS 
estimate using the predicted RDS as the IV is identical to the baseline 2SLS estimate, 
which confirms that the RDS is indeed exogenous. 
Columns 5 and 6 follow the trade literature to use the bilateral distance between 
countries as the IV for trade. Specifically, I use the distance to the nearest top 10 net 
grain-exporting countries in each year as the IV for grain imports. The bilateral 
distances between countries are derived from the dataset of Mayer and Zignago (2011). 
Appendix C1 details the construction of the distance IV and shows that the distance IV 
is strongly and negatively correlated with the grain imports. As presented in column 5, 
the 2SLS estimate based on the distance IV is about one-third smaller than the baseline 
estimate, but still suggests that the grain imports significantly reduced the GDP per 
capita. The smaller estimated effect is likely because it is not just grain trade through 
which the distance IV affects income.19 Note that since the distance IV is available for 
both developing and developed countries in continuous years from 1950 to 2016, the 
study sample in column 5 is much larger. Column 6 uses both the bilateral distance and 
the predicted RDS as IVs (and, thus, focuses only on the 78 developing countries from 
1960 to 2000) and shows the same estimated effect, suggesting that the IV estimate is 
not sensitive to the study sample. Comparable results are observed when using the 
distance to the nearest top 5 or 15 net grain-exporting countries as the IV. 
 
19 The main analysis of this study does not depend on the distance IV because it affects income not 
only through grain trade. The trade literature usually uses bilateral distance as the IV for trade value 
based on the assumption that the geographical distance affects a country’s economic outcomes only 
through trade (e.g., Frankel and Romer 1999). This assumption is valid when the trade is broadly defined 
to include elements such as FDI and the accompanying technology diffusion. When considering the 
specific grain trade, however, this assumption is likely invalid. To the extent that the distance IV affects 
income through trade elements beyond grain trade, the 2SLS estimate could capture the effect of these 
other trade elements. Because trade elements correlated with distance, such as FDI and technology 
diffusion, usually have a positive effect on income, the 2SLS estimate based on the distance IV tends to 
be biased towards the positive end. This explains why the estimated negative effect of grain imports is 
smaller when using the distance IV. 
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5.3.3 Excluding Grain-exporting Countries 
Column 7 excludes sample countries that were net exporters of the 10 major crops 
in 2000. It is reasonable for the baseline estimation to include both grain importers and 
grain exporters because the effect direction of the net grain imports is predicted to be 
the same: grain imports reduce income and grain exports increase income. However, 
there is a potential concern that the estimated negative association may be mainly driven 
by the grain-exporting countries. This is possible considering that, as presented in 
Figure B3, several large GR-advantaged countries dominated the increase in grain 
exports among the developing countries. If this concern is valid, the baseline estimate 
cannot be used to support the major argument of this study that the GR hinders income 
growth in the GR-disadvantaged countries through increasing their grain imports. 
Fortunately, column 7 eliminates this concern by showing that the negative effect is 
even larger when the grain-exporting countries are excluded from the sample. This 
finding also suggests that the marginal damage from grain imports is larger than the 
marginal benefit from the grain exports. 
5.3.4 Falsification Tests 
A crucial underlying assumption of the 2SLS estimation is that, conditional on the 
country and year fixed effects, the RDS is not correlated with the income trends prior 
to the GR. Violating this assumption would imply that the RDS is endogenous in the 
sense that it is correlated with the omitted preexisting income determinants. This 
assumption can be verified by estimating a flexible version of model (2) that replaces 
the ln itImp  by the interactions between the 1965–2000 average RDS ( iRDS ) and a 




ln kiit i t k t it it
k
y RDS year Z    
=
= + +  + +  . (3) 
Because continuous annual data on GDP per capita are available from 1951 to 2016, 
the flexible model could identify the effect of the average RDS on GDP per capita in 
each year starting from 1951. If the RDS captures only the effect of the GR, but not the 
effect of the omitted income determinants correlated with preexisting growth trends, 
the flexible model should find that the average RDS had no effect on the income prior 
to the GR. 
Figure 4 reports the estimated coefficients 
k s   together with their 95% 
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confidence intervals. Consistent with the identification assumption, the estimated 
coefficients are all close to zero and statistically insignificant prior to the GR (i.e., prior 
to 1965). The figure also shows that the coefficient starts declining since the GR and 
becomes significantly negative later on. It confirms the main finding of this article that 
the GR reduced GDP per capita in developing countries disadvantaged in adopting 
HYVs.20 In addition, although the main analysis of this study is based on data until 
2000, the flexible regression suggests that the negative effects of the GR lasted at least 
up to 2016. Very similar estimates were obtained when the average RDS was replaced 
by the average predicted RDS in model (3). 
 
Figure 4. Relationship between the average RDS between 1965 and 2000 and the 
GDP per capita in each year 
Note: Each dot on the solid line is the point estimate of k s  from equation (3), and the broken 
lines indicate the 95% confidence intervals. 
5.3.5 Additional Robustness Tests 
Various additional robustness tests of the baseline 2SLS estimate are presented in 
Appendix C2. The additional robustness tests involve measuring grain imports by the 
per capita values; using a standardized measure of the relative disadvantage in adopting 
HYVs; excluding extreme values of grain imports; controlling for linear and quadratic 
time trends; clustering the error terms at different levels; and focusing on the sectoral 
GDP per capita. All these robustness tests confirm the baseline finding that the GR-
induced grain imports substantially reduced the GDP per capita in countries 
disadvantaged in adopting HYVs. Appendix C2 also explains why these alternative 
model settings are not used in the main analysis. 
 
20 Note that the magnitude of individual point estimates in Figure 4 is difficult to interpret. Because 
the iRDS  is time invariant and the model includes country and year fixed effects, the estimated sk  
must be measured relative to a baseline time-period, which I take to be 1951. Therefore, the absolute 
level simply tells us the difference in the relationship relative to an arbitrarily chosen baseline. 
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5.4. Why Grain Imports Reduced Income? 
This section attempts to explain why grain imports have such a large detrimental 
effect on the per capita income. Specifically, I adopt a mediation analysis to investigate 
if and to which extent the effect of grain imports on income can be explained by a series 
of potential mediator variables. The standard mediation analysis comprises four steps: 
first, the total effect of grain imports on income ( 1 ) is estimated; second, the effect of 
grain imports on each of the K  potential mediators ( ka ) is estimated; third, the effect 
of each mediator on the income ( kb ), conditional on grain imports and other mediators, 
is estimated; and finally, the mediation effect through each mediator ( k ka b ) and the 
proportion of the total effect mediated ( 1k ka b  ) are calculated. 
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In the model, k
it
z  is k’s mediator variable, ka  captures the effect of grain imports on 
mediator k  , 
k
b  is the effect of mediator k  on the GDP per capita, and c  is the 
effect of grain imports not mediated. All other variables are as defined before. Each 
equation includes the country and year fixed effects to account for confounding factors. 
I estimate equations in model (4) simultaneously using the seemingly unrelated 
regressions (SUR) that allow the error terms to be correlated across equations.21 The 
SUR estimation also facilitates the calculation of the mediation effect, which involves 
combining the estimates across equations. Finally, to address the endogeneity of grain 
imports, ln itImp  in each equation of the SUR is instrumented by the RDS.22 
 
21 Very similar results were obtained when estimating the system of equations by structural equation 
modeling using the Stata package sem. 
22 In the SUR, the IV for grain imports is manually included in each equation in four steps: first, 
regress the log grain imports on the RDS in a panel model with country and year fixed effects; second, 
calculate the predicted log grain imports from the regression; third, replace the log grain imports in each 
equation of model (4) by the predicted log grain imports; and finally, fix the standard errors in the SUR 
by bootstrap with 200 replications. This estimation process is similar to that for manually conducted 
2SLS estimation detailed by Cameron and Pravin (2010). The standard errors of the estimated indirect 
effect are also obtained from bootstrap with 200 replications in order to address the concern that the 
estimate of the indirect effect may not be normally distributed (Shrout and Bolger 2002). Very similar 

































(1) The effect of log grain imports on each 
mediator  
 0.026*** 0.949*** -0.137*** -0.211*** -0.409*** -0.186***   
 (0.005) (0.169) (0.028) (0.021) (0.062) (0.019)   
(2) The effect of log grain imports and 
mediators on the log GDP per capita 
-0.031*** -0.216** -0.014*** 0.038** 0.256*** 0.025*** 0.111***   
(0.012) (0.089) (0.003) (0.016) (0.020) (0.007) (0.022)   
(3) Mediation effect of each variables  -0.006** -0.013*** -0.005*** -0.054*** -0.010*** -0.021***  -0.109*** 
 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005)  (0.010) 
(4) Share of the total effect mediated (%)  4.3 9.3 3.6 38.6 7.1 15.0  77.9 
Notes: This table reports the estimation results of model (4) based on seemingly unrelated regressions. Row 1 reports the estimated effect of grain imports on each mediator 
( ka ), row 2 reports the estimated effect of each mediator and grain imports on income ( kb  and c ), row 3 reports the calculated mediation effect of each mediator ( k ka b ), 
and row 4 reports the share of the total effects mediated ( 1k ka b  ). All standard errors reported in parentheses are estimated from bootstrap with 200 replications (see Footnote 




Table 3 reports the estimated mediation effects of six time-varying income 
determinants that may be affected by the grain imports: the population size, birth rate, 
years of schooling, capital formation, inward FDI, and per hectare grain yield (see Table 
A2 for variable definitions).23 As reported in row 1, the estimated effects of grain 
imports on the six mediators (
k
a ) are all statistically significant and are consistent with 
the theoretical predictions.24 Specifically, the estimates presented in columns b1–b6 
indicate that a one-unit increase in the log grain imports increases the population size 
by 2.6 percentage points, increases the crude birth rate by 0.95 (births per 1,000 people), 
reduces the average years of schooling by 0.14 years, reduces the per capita physical 
capital formation by 21.1 percentage points, reduces the per capita inward FDI by 40.9 
percentage points, and reduces the per hectare grain yield by 0.19 rice-equivalent tons. 
Row 2 presents the effect of mediators on income (
k
b ) and the remaining effect of 
grain imports ( c ). All mediators have significant effects on income, and the effect of 
grain imports not explained is only -0.031. Row 3 reports the estimated mediation effect 
from each mediator (
k ka b ). Row 4 reports the share of the total effect mediated by each 
mediator ( 1k ka b   ), which ranges from 3.6% to 38.6% across mediators. The six 
mediators together explained 77.9% of the total effect. Note that the estimated 
explanatory power of each mediator should be interpreted with caution because the 
mediators are likely endogenous and correlated with each other; 25  however, the 
mechanisms identified (based on the IV estimates in row 1) and the total mediation 
effect calculated (based on the IV estimates of 1  and c , i.e., ( )1 1 77.9%c − = ) are 
reasonably credible. Therefore, most of the detrimental effect of grain imports on GDP 
per capita can be explained by the grain-import-caused faster population growth, slower 
human and physical capital formation, and lower grain yield. 
 
23 I also examined various other income determinants, such as life expectancy, dependency ratio, and 
urbanization rate, and found that they have only a negligible mediation effect. 
24 The theoretical model predicts that grain imports increase fertility, reduce human capital formation, 
and reduce the per hectare agricultural yield. Although the simple model does not include physical capital 
and FDI, it is straightforward to extend the prediction to them: because grain imports reduce productivity 
in manufacturing and mining, they should also reduce physical capital investment and FDI by reducing 
the returns to them. 
25 While grain imports in each equation of model (4) are instrumented by the RDS, providing 
independent instruments for each of the mediators is difficult. As such, while the estimates in row 1 can 
be interpreted as causal effects, most estimates in rows 2 and 3 may merely reflect an associative 
relationship. In addition, because mediators are likely correlated with each other, one mediator may 
capture the effect of others. For example, a larger population mechanically reduces the per capita capital 
and FDI; thus, the latter two variables could capture part of the mediation effect of the population size. 
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6. The Effect of the Green Revolution on Income Divergence 
This section evaluates the extent to which the GR could explain the dramatic 
divergence in income observed across the developing world since the 1960s. As 
discussed before, the GR could affect a country’s per capita income through two 
channels: the direct effect through increasing the domestic grain productivity (measured 
by the HYV adoption rate), and the indirect effect through changing the cross-country 
relative grain productivity (measured by the RDS). Up to this point, I have only 
estimated the indirect effect, and the direct effect has been estimated by Gollin et al. 
(2018). This section combines the direct and indirect effects to evaluate the total effect 
of GR on cross-country income divergence. 
Panel A of Figure 5 presents the estimated indirect effect of the GR on GDP per 
capita through grain trade for each of the 78 sample countries by 2000. The country-
level indirect effect is calculated by combining the marginal effect of the RDS on grain 
imports (column 2, Table 1), the marginal effect of grain imports on GDP per capita 
(column 2, Table 2), and each country’s RDS in 2000. The calculation showed that only 
12 countries (from Asia and South America) are benefited from the GR-induced grain 
trade, whereas the remaining 66 countries are damaged. This finding is consistent with 
the observation that several large countries (such as China and India) dominated the 
cultivation areas of HYVs in the developing world and thus dominated the increase in 
the net grain exports during the GR (see Figure B3). The effect of grain trade ranged 
from -64 to 37 percentage points across the sample countries, and the (simple) average 
effect for these countries was -33.1 percentage points by 2000. The significantly 
negative average effect again reflects the fact that mainly several large countries 
benefited from the GR-induced grain trade. 
Panel B presents the estimated direct effect. I estimated the direct effect by 
replicating the main estimation of Gollin et al. (2018), which can be rewritten as follows: 
 1ln it i t it ity HYV   = + + +  , (5) 
where all variables are as defined above. In the estimation, the endogeneity of the HYV 
adoption rate ( itHYV  ) is addressed using the predicted HYV adoption rate (see 
Appendix B2) as the IV. As presented in Appendix D, similar to Gollin et al. (2018), I 
estimated that a one-unit increase in the HYV adoption rate led to a 1.53 percentage 
point increase in the GDP per capita by 2000. I then combined this estimate with the 
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HYV adoption rate of each country to calculate the country-level direct effect. The 
figure shows that most countries benefited from HYV adoption, and the average effect 





Figure 5. Impact of the GR on GDP per capita through two channels 
Note: The indirect effect through grain trade (Panel A) is calculated based on the baseline 2SLS estimates 
reported in column 2 of Table 2. The direct effect through HYV adoption (Panel B) is calculated based 
on the 2SLS estimates from column 2 of Table D1. The total effect (Panel C) is calculated as the sum of 
direct and indirect effects. 
Panel A: Indirect effect through grain trade 
Panel B: Direct effect through HYV adoption 
Panel C: Total effect from the two channels 
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Panel C presents the total effect, which is calculated as the sum of the direct and 
indirect effects from Panels A and B of the same figure. It shows that the GR increased 
the GDP per capita in 38 countries while reducing that in the remaining 40 countries. 
The average effect across the 78 countries was mildly positive (9.6 percentage points). 
Countries that experienced the largest loss in GDP per capita were mainly from Africa, 
whereas countries that gained the most were mainly from Asia. Sixteen African 
countries experienced a more than 40 percentage point loss in GDP per capita by 2000 
(Mozambique, Chad, Guinea, Zambia, Senegal, South Africa, Burkina Faso, Togo, 
Malawi, Liberia, Mauritania, Libya, Central African Republic, Niger, Burundi, and 
Republic of the Congo). In contrast, the GR more than doubled the GDP per capita in 
eight Asian countries (China, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Viet Nam, India, 
Philippines, and Indonesia) during the same period. However, not just African countries 
experienced a dramatic loss from the GR. Countries that experienced a more than 40 
percentage point loss were also from the Caribbean (Haiti, Guatemala, El Salvador, 
Panama, and Jamaica), Middle East (Yemen and Jordan), and Asia (Mongolia). 
Finally, I illustrate the extent to which the observed income divergence between 
developing countries could be explained by the estimated effects of the GR presented 
in Figure 5. To do so, I classify the sample countries into two groups based on whether 
the total effect of the GR on their 2000 GDP per capita was positive (38 countries) or 
negative (40 countries). I then compared the actual GDP per capita of the two groups 
with the corresponding counterfactual GDP per capita that eliminates the total effect of 
the GR.26 Figure 6 presents the actual and counterfactual GDP per capita for the two 
groups of countries from 1960 to 2000. The actual difference in GDP per capita between 
these two groups of countries almost tripled from 1267 US$ in 1960 to 3475 US$ in 
2000. In sharp contrast, when the total effect of the GR was excluded, these two groups 
roughly paralleled in GDP per capita from 1960 to 1980 and then converged. Therefore, 
the income divergence observed between these two groups of developing countries 
from 1960 to 2000 can be mostly explained by the GR. 
 
26 The counterfactual GDP per capita (income for short) for each group in a given year, such as 1990, 
is calculated in three steps: first, a country’s 1960 income is multiplied with the estimated total 
percentage-point effect of the GR on the country’s income by 1990 to obtain the changes in income from 
1960 to 1990 that were caused by the GR; second, I subtracted the calculated GR’s effect in step 1 from 
the observed 1990 income to obtain the counterfactual income in 1990 for each country; finally, I 




Figure 6. Explanatory power of the GR on the income divergence 
Note: The figure classifies the 78 sample countries into two groups based on whether the total effect of 
the GR on their 2000 GDP per capita was positive (38 countries) or negative (40 countries). The solid 
lines represent the observed GDP per capita, and the dashed lines represent the counterfactual GDP per 
capita that eliminates the estimated effect of the GR (See Footnote 26 for details). 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
A longstanding question in economics is why some countries are so much richer 
than others. A natural starting point to answer this question is to examine the origin of 
the historical income divergence. The two largest income divergences in modern history 
coincided in timing and region with the two most significant agricultural revolutions, 
suggesting that the cross-country asymmetric agricultural growth could be the origin of 
income divergence. This study showed that large subsets of developing countries shared 
nearly identical growth trends for centuries dramatically diverged in income per capita 
since the GR. Depending on data from 78 developing countries, this study shows that 
the GR could explain most of the income divergence across developing countries since 
the 1960s. It also shows that the GR led countries more suitable for cultivating GR 
crops to experience faster growth in manufacturing, larger increases in education, more 
accumulation of physical capital, and slower growth of population. The effects on these 
income determinants explained why differences in agricultural productivity from the 
GR could lead to such a large income divergence. 
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Beyond the conventional wisdom that domestic agricultural growth promotes 
domestic income growth, this study shows that a disadvantage in agriculture (relative 
to foreign countries) hinders the growth of developing countries via international trade. 
It shows that countries that gained comparative advantage in agriculture from the GR 
tend to also gain comparative advantage in manufacturing and, therefore, lead other 
developing countries to specialize in unpromising extractive industries. This finding 
provides an explanation for the widely documented “growth puzzle” that many 
developing countries stagnated during the 1980s and 1990s, despite the adoption of 
policy reforms (e.g., Bairoch 1995, Stiglitz 2002).27 This finding also explains why the 
second income divergence since the 1960s was much more dramatic than the first 
income divergence since the early 19th century: the far more integrated global 
environment enlarged the impact of relative agricultural productivity growth on income 
divergence via promoting international trade.28 
I would like to conclude this article by highlighting its major policy implication: 
developing countries generally cannot bypass an agricultural revolution to successfully 
launch their economic transformations, even in an integrated global environment with 
declining food prices. This study shows that for developing countries disadvantaged in 
agriculture, declining food prices in the world market are detrimental, instead of 
beneficial, for their transition to industry and long-run growth. Moreover, it also 
suggests that countries generally cannot avoid the detrimental effect of disadvantage in 
agriculture by protecting their agriculture from foreign trade because the detrimental 
effect works not only through agricultural trade but also through the trade of non-
agricultural products. Because unsuitability for cultivating GR crops is a major cause 
of the stagnant growth in a large subset of developing countries over the past decades, 
research programs focusing on improving agricultural productivity for these countries 




27 Existing studies explained the stagnant growth by political instability, dysfunctional institutions, 
low schooling, and insufficient infrastructure (Easterly and Levine 1997, Temple and Johnson 1998, 
Collier and Gunning 1999, Acemoglu et al. 2001, Brunnschweiler and Bulte 2008, Huillery 2009). This 
study shows that countries that experienced stagnant growth or recessions during this period are mainly 
those with a relatively low adoption rate of GR crops (Figure B4).  
28 Another important reason is that the GR for developing countries is built on the scientific advances 
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A. Data Sources 
This paper depends on data mainly obtained from the following six sources: (1) the 
GDP and population data from the Maddison Project Database 2018; (2) the HYV 
adoption rate data from Evenson and Gollin (2003b); (3) the grain trade data from the 
FAO Statistical Databases; (4) the data on agro-climatic suitability for cultivating crops 
from the Global Agro-Ecological Zone dataset computed by FAO; (5) the data on 
various control variables and trade of non-grain products from the World Development 
Indicators of the World Bank; and (6) the data on bilateral distances between countries 
from Mayer and Zignago (2011).  
From these datasets, I constructed a sample of 78 developing countries in five-year 
intervals from 1960 to 2000 (according to the criteria detailed in Footnote 13). Note 
that grain trade data from the FAO Statistical Databases are not available before 1961. 
To match with the 5-year interval HYV adoption data starting from 1960, I used the 
grain trade in 1961 as an approximation of that in 1960. Table A1 lists the 78 sample 
countries. Table A2 presents the data source and definition of each of the 28 variables 
used in this study. Summary statistics are presented in various figures in the main text 




Table A1. The Sample Countries 
Argentina Haiti Nigeria 
Bangladesh Honduras Pakistan 
Benin India Panama 
Bolivia Indonesia Paraguay 
Brazil Iran Peru 
Burkina Faso Iraq Philippines 
Burundi Jamaica Rwanda 
Cambodia Jordan Saudi Arabia 
Cameroon Kenya Senegal 
Central African Rep. Laos Sierra Leone 
Chad Lebanon South Africa 
Chile Liberia Sri Lanka 
China Libya Sudan 
Colombia Madagascar Syria 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Malawi Tanzania 
Congo, Rep. Malaysia Thailand 
Costa Rica Mali Togo 
Cuba Mauritania Tunisia 
Cote D'ivoire Mexico Turkey 
Dominican Rep. Mongolia Uganda 
Ecuador Morocco Uruguay 
Egypt Mozambique Venezuela 
El Salvador Myanmar Viet Nam 
Ghana Nepal Yemen 
Guatemala Nicaragua Zambia 
Guinea Niger Zimbabwe 
Note: The table lists the 78 sample countries for which the data on HYV adoption and GDP per capita are 


















Table A2. Definition and Data Sources of all Variables Used 
Variable name Definition  Sources 
Key variables 
HYV adoption rate Country-level yearly HYV adoption rates of the 10 major food 
crops. 
A 
Net grain imports  Yearly import values minus export values for the 10 major 
crops together in 2011 US$.  
B 
GDP  Real GDP in 2011 US$.  C 
Population Middle-year total population in thousands.  C 
Agro-climatically 
attainable yield 
The highest attainable yield under the local climatic 
conditions.  
D 
Crop harvested area Country-level yearly harvested area of each crop in hectare 
(used when calculating the RDS).  
B 
Variables used in summary statistics or robustness tests 
Per hectare grain yield The harvesting-area-weighted average (rice equivalent, see 




The ratio of net import to domestic consumption of the 10 
major food crops. 
B 
Bilateral distance Bilateral distance between countries in 1000 km.  E 
Net manufacture imports The sum of the net import values of chemicals, basic 
manufactures, machinery and transport equipment, and 
miscellaneous manufactured goods. 
F 
Net raw material imports The sum of the net import values of fuel, ores, metals, and 
agricultural products besides the 10 major crops. 
F 
Control variables 
The share of agriculture in 
GDP 
The percentage of agriculture, forestry, and fishing value 
added in total GDP.  
F 
The crude birth rate Annual number of births per 1,000 people. F 
Life expectancy Life expectancy at birth. F 
Dependency ratio Yearly percentage of working-age population.  F 
Log capital formation per 
capita 
Log capital formation per capita in 2011 US$. F 
Log inward FDI per capita Log inward FDI per capita in 2011 US$. F 
Landlocked Whether the country is landlocked, dummy.  E 
Soil rooting condition Country average farmland soil rooting condition index.  B 
Soil nutrient index Country average farmland soil nutrient index. B 
Precipitation Annual total precipitation in mm.  D 
Temperature Annual mean temperature in degree centigrade.  D 
Log 1960 GDP per capita Log real GDP per capita in 1960 in 2011 US$. C 
Official language The first official language of the country.  E 
Colonizer The most important colonizer that participated in long period 
and substantial governance. 
E 
Per hectare grain output Per hectare output value of the 10 major crops in 2011 US$. B 
Urbanization The percentage of the population in urban agglomerations 
with 500,000 or more inhabitants. 
H 
Years of schooling Average years of schooling for population aged 25 and over.  G 
Data sources: A. Evenson and Gollin (2003b) 
B. FAO Statistical Databases. 
C. Maddison Project Database 2018.  
D. Global Agro-ecological Zone data, FAO. 
E. Mayer and Zignago (2011) 
F. World Development Indicators, the World Bank. 
G. Barro and Lee (2013) 
H. The UN World Urbanization Prospects (2018) database  
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B. Appendix for the GR’s Effect on Trade 
This appendix provides the summary statistics of the effects of GR on grain 
productivity, prices, and trade. It also details the construction of the predicted RDS. 
Finally, it provides falsification tests to show that the RDS has no effect on grain trade 
prior to the GR. 
B1 Summary Statistics  
Figure B1 presents the correlation between the adoption rate of HYVs in 2000 and 
the changes in the productivity of 10 major crops from 1965 to 2000 in 78 developing 
countries. To make the yields of the 10 crops comparable, I calculated their rice 
equivalents based on the calorie content. For example, 1 ton of potatoes has 763,353 
calories, the same number of calories that are in 0.221 tons of rice because rice has 
3439,348 calories per ton. As such, one ton of potatoes expressed in rice equivalents is 
0.221 tons. The calorie content information was obtained from the nutritional 
composition table provided by the United Nation World Food Program. 
 
Figure B1. Correlation between the adoption rate of HYVs in 2000 and changes in the 
crop productivity from 1965 to 2000 in 78 developing countries 
Notes: The country-level adoption rate of HYVs was calculated as the weighted-average across the 10 major 
food crops, using each crop’s harvesting area as the weighting. The 10 major crops are wheat, rice, maize, barley, 
potatoes, millet, sorghum, cassava, dry beans, and groundnut. The yield per hectare is calculated as the rice 
equivalent (harvesting-area-weighted) average yield of the 10 crops. The data for HYV adoption rate and yield are 




Figure B2 shows that the average price index for the three GR crops (rice, wheat, 
and maize) declined from 71.9 in 1960 to 18.5 in 2000. The price decline was not caused 
by the reduced food demand because (as shown in the same figure) the world population 
doubled from 3.02 billion to 6.12 billion during this period. 
 
Figure B2. Real prices of three major staple crops and the world population 
Data sources: Price indexes, Max and Hannah (2019); world population, the Maddison Project Database 2018. 
Table B1 shows that the domestic prices of the GR corps in developing countries 
were highly correlated with the world prices, even for relatively closed countries. For 
each crop, I calculated the Pearson correlation coefficient (PCC) between the 
international price index and the domestic price (in international dollars) for each 
country during 2000–2010.29 The table presents the average PCC for each category of 
countries indicated in the leftmost column. Panel A classifies the sample countries 
according to their import-consumption ratio for each crop. It shows a strong positive 
correlation between the domestic and world prices, even for countries with an import-
consumption ratio lower than 5%. Similarly, Panel B classifies the sample countries 
according to their adoption rates of HYVs and also shows a strong positive correlation, 
even for countries most disadvantaged in adopting HYVs. 
 
29 Domestic crop prices prior to 2000 are unavailable for many developing countries. I also examined 
the correlation prior to 2000 for countries for which the data are available and found similar results. 
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Table B1. Correlation between international and domestic prices of major crops 
 Averaged Pearson correlation coefficient 
 Rice Wheat Maize 
A. Classified according to the import-consumption ratio  
Higher than 20% 0.82 0.70 0.73 
 (0.22) (0.20) (0.31) 
Between 5% and 20% 0.67 0.85 0.73 
 (0.51) (0.12) (0.22) 
Lower than 5% 0.76 0.65 0.69 
 (0.24) (0.05) (0.09) 
B. Classified according to the disadvantage in adopting HYVs 
All disadvantaged countries 0.75 0.74 0.72 
 (0.35) (0.18) (0.26) 
One-third most disadvantaged 0.73 0.77 0.75 
 (0.48) (0.12) (0.20) 
One-fifth most disadvantaged 0.77 0.82 0.73 
 (0.39) (0.11) (0.28) 
Note: The table presents the average Pearson correlation coefficient (PCC) between the international 
price index and the domestic price (in Int’l$) during 2000–2010 for each category of countries. The 
sample countries are 66 developing countries disadvantaged in adopting HYVs. A PCC of 0.5 or larger 





Figure B3. Correlation between the RDS in 2000 and the changes in the log net grain 





Figure B3 presents the significantly positive correlation between the RDS in 2000 
and the changes in the log net grain imports from 1965 to 2000. A simple regression 
showed that a one-unit increase in the RDS corresponds to an 8.2 percentage point 
increase in grain imports, which is similar to the effect estimated by the fixed-effect 
panel model in Table 1. The figure also shows that all countries that experienced a large 
increase in the grain imports are GR-disadvantaged countries (with a positive RDS). 
For an average disadvantaged country, the log net grain imports increased by 2.5 from 
1965 to 2000, which corresponds to a 1,118 percentage point increase in the net grain 
imports (i.e., exp(2.5) 1 11.18− =  ). The largest increase in the net grain exports (i.e., 
decline in net grain imports) occurred in the four Asian countries advantaged in 
adopting HYVs: China, India, Pakistan, and Vietnam. 
 
Figure B4. Correlation between changes in the log GDP per capita from 1965 to 2000 
and the adoption rate of HYVs in 2000 
Notes: The figure contains 78 developing countries where the data on HYV adoption rates are available. The 
data are derived from Evenson and Gollin (2003b) and the Maddison Project Database 2018. 
 
Figure B4 presents a strongly positive correlation between changes in the log GDP 
per capita from 1965 to 2000 and the adoption rate of HYVs in 2000 (the adoption rate 
in 1965 was virtually zero) for 78 developing countries. Strikingly, 27 countries with 
relatively low HYV adoption rates experienced significant declines in GDP per capita 
over this period. 
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B2 The Predicted RDS 
To address the concern that the RDS could be endogenous, I constructed an 
excluded IV for the RDS based on two sources of plausibly exogenous variation—the 
cross-sectional variation in the agro-climatic suitability for growing HYVs and the 
differentiated timing of the development of HYVs for different crops. A country’s agro-
climatic conditions should not be affected by the time-varying determinants of 
economic outcomes, and the timing of the development of HYVs is exogenous to 
individual developing countries (Conway 2012). 
The data on agro-climatic suitability for growing HYVs are derived from the Global 
Agro-Ecological Zone (GAEZ) dataset computed by FAO. The GAEZ data provide 
each major crop’s agro-climatically attainable yield, which is the highest attainable 
yield under the local climatic conditions and is estimated using complex biological 
models.30 The attainable yield varies across locations and crops. The cost of purchasing 
HYV seeds is independent of climate; thus, the net return of adopting them increases 
with the agro-climatically attainable yield. Regions with higher attainable HYV yields 
should have higher adoption rates. I used the attainable yield under the high input level 
(i.e., full application of synthetic fertilizer, irrigation, mechanization, and HYVs) that 
corresponds to modern farming techniques. 





j j j k j
it i t k i t it
k
HYV potential year u  
=
= + +  +  , (6) 
where jitHYV  is the real HYV adoption rate of crop j  in country i  and year t , and 
j
i
potential  is the average agro-climatically attainable yield of crop j  across all land 
suitable for agriculture in country i . To capture the fact that the HYVs of some crops 
were developed later than others, the jipotential  is interacted with a full set of time 




is the error term. 
The second step is to predict the adoption rate of each crop based on estimates of 
equation (6) and, then, to use the crop-level predicted value to calculate the country-
 
30 I refer the reader to the FAO GAEZ webpage (http://www.fao.org/nr/gaez/en/) for technical details.  
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where 
j
itHYV  is the predicted HYV adoption rate of crop j  in country i  and year t , 
and 1960jiArea  is the 1960 harvested area of crop j  in country i . 
 
Figure B5. Correlation between the predicted and the real disadvantage of adopting 
HYVs in 2000 
The final step is to use the country-level predicted adoption rate to calculate the 
predicted RDS: 
 it ittpRDS pHYV pHYV= −  ,  
where tpHYV   is the average predicted adoption rate across all sample countries 

















where 1960iTotalArea  is the 1960 total harvested area of the 10 crops in country i . As 
presented in Figure B5, the predicted RDS is strongly correlated with the observed RDS 




B3 Falsification Tests for the Effect of RDS on Grain Imports 
This appendix provides the falsification tests for the effect of RDS on grain imports. 
I estimated a flexible version of model (1) that replaces the RDS by the interactions 
between the 1965–2000 average predicted RDS (
i
pRDS ) and a full set of year dummies 




ln kit i t k t it iti
k
Imp pRDS year Z    
=
= + +  + +  . (7) 
Because continuous annual data on net grain imports are available from 1961 to 2016, 
the flexible model could estimate the effect of the average predicted RDS on grain 
imports in each year starting from 1961. If the predicted RDS captures only the effect 
of the GR, but not the effect of the preexisting differential trends across countries, the 
flexible model should find that the average predicted RDS had no effect on the grain 
imports prior to the GR.  
As presented in Figure B6, the estimation indeed finds that the average predicted 
RDS had no effect on the grain imports prior to 1965, suggesting that no endogeneity 
bias from preexisting differential trends. In addition, the figure shows that the effect of 
the predicted RDS significantly increased shortly after 1965 and became significantly 
positive later on. This finding is consistent with the main estimate that higher RDS leads 
to more grain imports. 
 
Figure B6. Flexible estimates of the effect of predicted RDS on grain imports 
Note: Each dot on the solid line is a point estimate of ska  from model (7), and the broken lines 




C. Appendix for the Effect of the GR on Income 
This appendix details the construction of the distance IV, provides additional 
robustness tests for the effect of grain imports on the GDP per capita, and presents the 
estimated effect of the GR-induced trade of manufactures and raw materials on GDP 
per capita.  
C1 The Distance IV 
The bilateral distance between countries has been widely employed as the IV for 
trade value, based on the assumption that the geographical distance affects a country’s 
economic outcomes only through trade (e.g., Frankel and Romer 1999). As a robustness 
check, I constructed an alternative IV for grain imports using the bilateral distances to 
major grain-exporting countries. 
 
Figure C1. Correlation between the net grain import values and the distance to the 
nearest top 10 net exporting countries in 2000 
Note: This figure contains only the net grain-importing countries in 2000. Similar 
correlations were found when using data from other sample years. 
 
The distance IV is constructed using the bilateral distances (in terms of market 
access) calculated by Mayer and Zignago (2011).31 In the construction, I first identify 
the 10 countries with the largest net export values of the 10 major food crops in each 
 
31 The bilateral distance between two countries is calculated using the distances between the two 
countries’ biggest cities. See http://www.cepii.fr/cepii/en for more details. 
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year. The top exporting countries are chosen from all the countries in the world and not 
only from the developing countries examined in this article. I then use each sample 
country’s bilateral distance to the nearest top 10 net exporting country as the IV. Note 
that the distance IV is time-varying partly because of the dramatic changes in the 
relative agricultural productivity across countries caused by the GR. As presented in 
Figure C1, the distance IV is strongly (p-value = 0.00) and negatively correlated with 
the net grain import values. I also constructed the bilateral distances to the nearest top 
5 or 15 net grain-exporting countries in the same way and obtained similar results. 
C2 Additional Robustness Checks 
This appendix provides six groups of additional robustness checks for the baseline 
2SLS estimation presented in column 2 of Table 2. Each of the robustness checks had 
the same model setting as the baseline estimation, except for the one specified in each 
check. All estimation results are presented in Table C1. 
The per capita measure of grain imports: Column 1 uses the log net per capita 
grain imports (instead of the log net total grain imports) as the key explanatory variable. 
The main analysis does not use the per capita measure because changes in the per capita 
grain imports not only reflect the effect of the GR-caused grain imports but also reflect 
the effect of population growth. The estimation results suggest that higher per capita 
grain imports also reduce GDP per capita, and the marginal effect is much larger. 
An alternative measure of the relative disadvantage: Column 2 uses the 
standardized RDS as the instrument variable, which is calculated as the RDS divided 
by its standard deviation. The normalization transforms the RDS from an interval 
measurement to a ratio measurement. Intuitively, the interval measurement (i.e., the 
RDS) is more relevant than the ratio measurement (i.e., the normalized RDS) when 
evaluating the relative disadvantage of a country in adopting HYVs. Nevertheless, 
when using the normalized RDS as the IV, the estimated coefficient is identical to the 
baseline estimate. 
Robust to outliers: Columns 3 and 4 exclude sample countries that had very low or 
very high grain imports. A potential concern of the baseline estimation is that if the 
estimated effect is mainly driven by countries with extremely low or extremely high 
grain imports, we cannot arrive at a general conclusion that the GR-caused grain 
imports are detrimental. Because it is difficult to define the extreme values of grain 
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imports, I simply excluded countries where the 2000 import-consumption ratio of the 
10 major crops ranked below the bottom 10% (column 3) or above the top 10% (column 
4). Excluding these potential extreme values does not alter the estimated effect. I also 
employed the threshold ranking values of 5% and 15% and obtained quite comparable 
results. 
Robust to country-specific time trends: Columns 5 and 6 additionally control for 
country-specific linear and quadratic time trends, respectively. These robustness checks 
address the concern that the estimated effect may be driven by the omitted time trends. 
The robustness checks relieve this concern by finding estimates identical to the baseline 
estimate. 
Robust to clustering methods: Columns 7 and 8 cluster the error terms at the 
country level and year level, respectively. The baseline estimation clusters the error 
terms at the region-year level to address the potential bias of the standard error due to 
the serial correlation over years or spatial correlation between countries within a region. 
These two robustness checks show that clustering the error terms at the country level 
(which addresses only series correlation) or year level (which addresses only spatial 
correlation) does not significantly alter the estimated standard error. 
Sectoral effects of grain imports: Columns 9–11 estimate the baseline model by 
using the log per capita output in agriculture, manufacturing, and service industries as 
the dependent variable, respectively. These robustness checks can be used to verify the 
prediction that grain imports impact sectors beyond agriculture. However, because the 
data on sectoral population (or employment) are not available over most of the sample 
periods (generally unavailable until 1991), I had to calculate the sectoral per capita 
output as the ratio of the sectoral total GDP to the national total population. Because 
grain imports could lead to labor reallocation, the sectoral estimates may be 
overestimated or underestimated due to the lack of data on sectoral employment. The 
sectoral estimation shows a significantly negative effect of grain imports in each sector, 





Table C1. Additional robustness checks of the baseline 2SLS estimate of Table 2 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Log net grain imports    -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.09*** -0.14*** -0.10*** 
(IV = RDS)   (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) 
Log net per capita grain imports  -0.89***           
(IV = RDS) (0.28)           
Log net grain imports   -0.14***          
(IV = Standardized RDS)  (0.05)          
Excluding the bottom 10% countries   Yes         
Excluding the top 10% countries    Yes        
Linear country-specific time trends     Yes       
Quadratic country-specific time trends      Yes      
Clustered by country       Yes     
Clustered by year        Yes    
Log per capita agriculture output         Yes   
Log per capita manufacturing output          Yes  
Log per capita service industry output           Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
First-stage F statistics 9.39 13.0 28.2 38.4 34.0 34.0 11.9 161.4 34.2 30.9 37.5 
Observations 702 702 631 632 702 702 702 702 684 657 657 
R-squared 0.379 0.878 0.842 0.805 0.841 0.841 0.841 0.841 0.661 0.869 0.915 
Notes: All columns have the same model setting as the baseline estimation (column 2 of Table 2), except for the one specified in each column. The first-stage F-statistic 
reported are the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic. If not specified, the standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the region-year level. The significance levels are *** 
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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C3 The Effect of The GR-induced Trade of Other Products 
This appendix examines the effect of the GR-induced trade of manufactures and 
raw materials on GDP per capita. This can be done by estimating a modified version of 
model (2) that replaces the key explanatory variable (i.e., net grain imports) by the net 
imports of manufactures or raw materials. The estimation results reported in Table C2 
confirm the predictions that manufacture imports and raw material exports reduced the 
GDP per capita in the GR-disadvantaged countries. Specifically, the 2SLS estimate 
reported in column 2 indicates that a 1 percentage point increase in the net import of 
manufactures reduces the GDP per capita by 0.3 percentage points. The 2SLS estimate 
reported in column 7 indicates that a 1 percentage point increase in the net export of 
raw materials reduces the GDP per capita by 0.17 percentage points. The remaining 
columns in Table C2 contain the robustness checks. The OLS estimates reported in 
columns 1 and 6 are substantially smaller, highlighting the importance of addressing 
the endogeneity bias. Columns 3–5 and columns 8-10 show that comparable effects can 
be estimated when including various control variables or using the predicted RDS as 
the IV. Note that the estimated marginal effects in Table C2 are not comparable to those 
in Table 2 due to the difference in the study sample. As mentioned before, trade data on 
manufactures and raw materials in early years (prior to 1991) are unavailable for many 
developing countries. Thus, the sample size in Table C2 is approximately 40% smaller 
than that in Table 2. Therefore, the estimates in Table C2 reflect more the effect in more 




Table C2. The effect of the imports of manufactures and raw materials on GDP per capita  





















Log net manufacture imports  -0.06*** -0.30*** -0.27*** -0.21*** -0.17***       
 (0.01) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03)       
Log net raw material imports        0.02 0.17*** 0.19*** 0.14*** 0.20*** 
       (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) 
IV  No IV RDS RDS RDS pRDS  No IV RDS RDS RDS pRDS 
Four time-invariant controls * year dummies    Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes 
Eight time-varying control variables    Yes      Yes  
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
First-stage F statistics  16.3 23.3 14.4 52.8   16.2 13.9 18.4 15.3 
Observations 402 402 399 359 399  374 374 371 339 371 
R-squared 0.953 0.877 0.908 0.924 0.944  0.947 0.865 0.865 0.910 0.853 
Notes: This table reports the estimates of modified versions of model (2) that use the log net manufacture imports or log net raw material imports as the key explanatory 
variables. The first-stage F-statistic reported is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic. The standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the region-year level. Significance 





D. The Direct Effect of HYV Adoption 
This appendix examines the direct effect of the GR on GDP per capita by replicating 
the main estimation of Gollin et al. (2018), which can be rewritten as follows: 
 1ln it i t it ity HYV   = + + +   (8) 
where all variables are as defined in this article. I estimate equation (8) using the 
dataset of this article, which is similar to the dataset of Gollin et al. (2018).32 The 
estimation results are reported in Table D1. To facilitate the comparison, Table D1 
adopted the same format as Table 3 of Gollin et al. (2018), which I copied to Panel B 
of Table D1. Specifically, column 1 presents the OLS estimate; column 2 presents the 
2SLS estimate, where the HYV is instrumented by the predicted HYV (see Appendix 
B2); and column 3 uses the predicted HYV instead of HYV for the OLS estimation. In 
Panel A, the 2SLS estimate suggests that a 1% higher HYV adoption rate increases 
GDP per capita by 1.53 percentage points, which is very close to the 2SLS estimate of 
Gollin et al. (2018) presented in Panel B. 
Table D1. The effect of the HYV adoption rate on the GDP per capita 








Panel A: Estimates of equation (8) using the dataset of this article 
Actual HYV adoption rate 1.05*** 1.53***  
  (0.20) (0.24)  
Predicted HYV adoption rate   1.54** 
    (0.63) 
Country-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 702 702 702 
Countries 78 78 78 
R-squared 0.944 0.942 0.938 
Panel B: Estimates reported in Table 3 of Gollin et al. (2018) 
Actual HYV adoption  0.99*** 1.48***  
  (0.18) (0.40)  
Predicted HYV adoption    1.80*** 
   (0.54) 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the country-level are listed in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** 
p < 0.01. 
 
 
32 While this study uses 5-year interval data, their paper used 10-year interval data. In addition, a 
sample country of this study (Jordan) was not included in their study, while two of their sample countries 
(Angola and Algeria) were excluded from this study due to missing values of GDP. 
